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Technical Support to the Falkland Islands Demining Programme

TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE FALKLANDS DEMINING PROGRAMME
This report and the associated exploitation work was funded by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
Aim
1.
The aim of this report is to outline the technical support provided to the Falklands demining
programme during the Austral summer of 2009/2010.
Technical support - general
2.

The majority of the technical support provided fell into two categories:
a. Detection; activities intended to enable the contractor to establish their detection
capabilities against the minimum-metal mines.
b. Exploitation; examination of recovered mines in order to observe the effects of aging
and assess their implications.

3.

A list of the main technical support activities undertaken is at Annex A.

Metal detection samples
4.
Technical support to detection began with an investigation into the metallic content of the
mines likely to be encountered; this would enable an assessment of detectability and allow the
‘worst case’ to be identified.
5.
Documentary research showed that the Spanish P4B anti-personnel (AP) mine and C3B
anti-tank (AT) mine had the lowest metal content of those likely to be encountered. The two mines
share a similar initiation system, with a small steel spring being the sole metallic fuze component.
The location of this spring, which sits lower within the AT mine, suggested that the C3B would be
the harder target to detect.

Figure 1: The Spanish P4B anti-personnel mine, with
safety cap to the left

Figure 2: The Spanish C3B anti-tank mine, with
safety cap to the left
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6.
The main charge of the P4B is normally covered with a foil made from lead alloy, although
there was speculation that this might have been removed from some mines as they were laid1.
7.
It was not clear to what extent – if any - the presence of the foil would make the P4B more
detectable. Nor was it clear whether the orientation of the mine would effect its detectability.
8.
Some sample mines had previously been made inert or ‘Free From Explosives’ (FFE),
however, the accuracy of their detection signatures was questionable. There was, therefore, a
need for accurate surrogates.
9.
Examples of inert mines held by C King Associates (CKA) were dismantled and the
components accurately characterised, then compared to the documentary sources. A batch of 50
springs were then sourced from a specialist company, replicating the characteristics and
specifications as accurately as possible2.
10. Precise measurements were taken to gauge the distance from the top surface of the mine to
the spring, and a test piece designed. Since the same spring is used in both the P4B and C3B
mines, and the spring is symetrical around the horizontal axis, a single test piece could represent
both mines. The off-set of the spring from each end of the test piece represented the location of
the component within each mine. The resultant test piece is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3
A detection test piece developed by CKA.
Note that in the image the spring inside the
detection piece is magnified by the curve of the
polymer surface making it appear larger than the
free air example on the right. The two springs
are actually identical

11. Eight test pieces were produced, six of which were immediately shipped to the Falklands (on
6 November 2009).
12. A number of springs were shipped direct to BACTEC UK (the clearance contractor) for
incorporation into inert mines and use in their own detection testing.
13. Work on other programmes3 had shown that corrosion could reduce – or even eliminate –
the detection signature of metallic components. Samples of springs were immersed in a weak
saline solution to assess their susceptibility to rusting; Figure 4 shows the results.

1

The first P4B recovered was indeed missing most of the lead foil, however, all remaining P4Bs were found with the
foil still in place.
2

Accuracy included correct steel type, spring mass to within two hundredths of a gram and all dimensions to within a
tenth of a millimeter.
3

Primarily CKA studies into the effects of aging on landmines, conducted on behalf of US State Department.
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Figure 4
Corrosion testing.
Two springs of the type used in the Spanish P4B
and C3B mines. The spring on the left has been
immersed in weak saline solution for two weeks.
The effect indicates that the spring is vulnerable
to rusting, which might reduce its detectability

14. The conclusion of the corrosion test was that springs were likely to be heavily rusted if water
had penetrated the fuze assembly. If so, the detection signature might be even lower, making the
mine virtually undetectable4.
Metal detection assessment
15. An in-depth assessment of detection capabilities began with a review of previous tests5 probably the most thorough and objective detection testing ever carried out and therefore provided
a good overview of likely capabilities.
16. Early findings in the Falkland Islands matched the theoretical detection assessment
reasonably well, however there were a number of variables that could not be taken into account.
These included:
 The potential influence of the lead foil in the P4B;
 The performance of the Minelab ‘yellow cap’ enhancement;
 The effect of mines/components at different angles of incidence;
 The influence of an aluminised explosive filling on detection.
Radar detection samples
17. The clearance contractor had been asked to undertake some research on dual-sensor mine
location using the Minehound detector. This would require targets with both the correct metallic
content and an appropriate radar signature.
18. CKA had previously commissioned production of a microcrystalline wax specifically for this
purpose. This wax has electrical and mechanical characteristics very similar to those of TNT, with
a far higher melting point than normal wax and blue colouring to avoid any possibility of confusion
with live explosive.
19. Several kilograms of the wax were carried to the Falklands, then moulded into the body of a
C3B AT mine. The mine was then re-sealed and marked as inert for use in Minehound detection
trials. The remaining wax was left with the Demining Programme Office (DPO) for filling AP mines,
if required.

4

In practice, very few fuzes had been penetrated by water; meanwhile, detection by instrument was ruled out (for
this contract) due to the shallow detection depth achieved during tests.
5

International Pilot Project for Technology Cooperation, dated October 2000
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Mine exploitation
20. Samples of all three mine types recovered during clearance operations (P4B, SB-33 and SB81) were disassembled in order to assess their condition. The examination did not encompass full
exploitation, but focussed on:
a. Ability to function;
b. Detectability;
c. Trends in deterioration.
21. 14 P4B AT mines had been recovered from the Sapper Hill minefield and retained for the
exploitation visit, while 17 SB-33 AP mines and 15 SB-81 AT mines were lifted from the Surf Bay
minefields during the course of the analysis.
22. In addition to the points listed above, lifting the mines allowed examination of the immediate
location in order to assess the effect on, or action of, the ground conditions.
23. Photos showing the recovery sequence for the Surf Bay mines (SB-33 and SB-81) are at
Annex B.
24.

Key findings from the exploitation work are at the following annexes:
a. P4B:
b. SB-33:
c. SB-81:

Annex C
Annex D
Annex E

Creation of training aids
25. All of the mines recovered for exploitation were rendered inert, with all explosive components
being sent for demolition. The inert mine casings were then marked with blue paint (the NATO
colour code for inert munitions) and set aside as training aids for future operations.

Figure 5: Inert Spanish P4B AP mines, with the waxfilled C3B body to the top left
Conclusions

Figure 6: Inert SB-33 and SB-81 mines awaiting final
safety checks and marking

26. The technical services provided by CKA covered a wide variety of functions, many of which
had not been anticipated at the time of the original contract.
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27. Most of the three types of mine examined appeared to be fully functional, with levels of
deterioration well below those expected.
28. Examination of recovered mines will be an important component of future clearance
operations, particularly since many of the remaining mines (such as those with steel cases or
exposed steel components) are known to have deteriorated to a far greater extent than those
encountered so far.

Recommendations
29. If possible, samples of target mines should be examined, well before clearance operations
commence, in order to determine the most appropriate clearance techniques and equipment.

Colin King
Director
C King Associates Ltd
April 2010
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LIST OF TECHNICAL SERVICES PROVIDED
Serial

Activity

Notes

1

Investigation of metallic
Involving documentary research and
content for the following mines: disassembly of inert mines to examine critical
P4B, C3B, SB-33, SB-81
components

2

Sourcing of replica
components

Procurement of springs and lead foil to
replicate those used in the P4B and C3B

3

Corrosion testing

Investigating the vulnerability of P4B and
C3B springs to rusting

4

Production of detection test
pieces

Design and fabrication of double-ended test
pieces to replicate the detection signatures of
P4B and C3B mines

5

Provision of replica springs to
the clearance contractor

Allowing the clearance contractor to complete
their own surrogate test pieces

6

Investigation of detection
capabilities against low-metal
mines

Involving review of the Detection Pilot Project
and discussions with detector manufacturers

7

Commissioning of report into
detection capabilities

Locating an independent detection agency
with access to the Minelab (yellow cap) and
other detectors for comparison. Agreeing
terms of reference and trial configurations

8

Provision of explosive
substitute for C-3-B mine body
(for Minehound trials)

Microcrystaline wax blocks were taken to the
Falkland Islands and moulded into the body
of an inert C3B

9

Exploitation of P4B, SB-33 and
SB-81 mines

Involving the recovery, disarming,
disassembly and examination of live mines

10

Creation of training aids

Removal of all explosive material from
sample mines, followed by appropriate
marking
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THE MINE EXTRACTION PROCESS

Overview of the Surf Bay minefield

A clearance lane, with located mines to the right

Beginning extraction of an SB-81 AT mine

Turf was cut from above the mine

Cut turf was removed in blocks to expose the
entire body of the mine

With the mine extracted, the underlying ground
was photographed and examined

B-1

Annex B to
Technical Support to the Falkland Islands Demining Programme

Extracted mines were disarmed immediately

A wet ditch containing a number of mines

An SB-33 AP mine under water

An SB-33 in relatively dry ground

The extraction process for the SB-33 was similar
to that used for the SB-81

Disarming the SB-33 by unscrewing the detonator
assembly from the base of the mine
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EXAMINATION OF THE P4B

Figure 2

Figure 1

Most of the P4B mines examined showed little obvious sign of external degradation, with both the colour
and the texture of the plastic casing appearing virtually ‘as new’ (Figure 1). However, the condition of
some mines suggests that this initial visual impression may be misleading, and that all of the plastic
casings are now beginning to deteriorate.
Many had some degree of root penetration between the underside of the fuze (Figure 2) and the mine
body. This type of growth would not affect performance, although it is possible that further enlargement of
the roots might eventually force the two assemblies apart, resulting in malfunction.

Throughout the course of the
clearance operation, all but
one of the P4B mines
examined
had
the
red
lacquered lead foil present in
fuze well.
As the fuze
assembly is fitted, this foil
ruptures
in
unpredictable
patterns (Figure 3). The shape
of the ruptured foil is known to
affect the return on short-wave
radar and may also affect the
signature with some metal
detectors.
Figure 3

C-1
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Figure 4

Figure 5

The P4B pressure plate shown in Figures 4 and 5 shows the type of long-term deterioration expected in
ABS plastic. Increasing brittleness has caused fine cracks where the plastic is under stress; this has led
to eventual failure, permitting the ingress of water. In most samples examined, cracking was not
immediately visible; however, it is evident that the plastic is becoming more brittle and that all casings
would eventually reach this stage. Previous studies have shown that such deterioration accelerates,
since the effects (such as increasing the exposed surface area) make the material even more vulnerable
to further degradation. Extensive tests would be required in order to assess the rate of degradation.

Figure 6

Figure 7

Even where water had penetrated the fuze assembly, the firing spring (Figure 6) was in remarkably good
condition and remained fully functional. This was surprising, although, had the mines been nearer the
coast, salt-water would probably have caused more extensive rusting. This would further degrade the
detection signal from the small metallic mass.
It is important to note that the P4B can function regardless of the spring’s condition. The firing pin is
made from polymethylacrylate plastic, which is unlikely to deteriorate significantly within the foreseeable
future. It is forced through a polythene ring by a spacer and this action alone may be sufficient to cause
initiation without the additional impetus of the spring. These plastic components are shown in Figure 7.
C-2
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Figure 8

Figure 9

The detonator assembly is bonded into the fuze body and has to be cut from the mine, as shown in
Figure 8. The stab-sensitive receptor in the centre is covered by a thin plastic film (seen here having
been cut using a scalpel) to keep it dry. A similar assembly, shown in Figure 9, was full of water.
The presence of water might prevent the stab receptor
from initiating, since water-soluble compounds are
used within the composition. This is likely to be the
primary cause of failure for P4B mines in the near
term.
As expected, the pressed TNT charges (Figure 10)
were in good condition, despite many being wet. TNT
is relatively stable, especially when protected from
sunlight. This High Explosive (HE) content is likely to
remain functional for the foreseeable future.
Figure 10

Conclusions
1. Most of the P4B mines examined appeared to be fully functional.
2. Deterioration of the plastic casings has begun, but – in most instances - is progressing at a far
slower rate than expected. Most mines have retained their structural integrity.
3. The ingress of water into the fuze assembly has caused only minor deterioration of the striker
springs. This will not significantly affect the detection signature or the mine’s ability to function.
4. The ingress of water into the detonator assembly may render the mine inoperative; this would
need to be confirmed by testing.
5. The lead foil was present in all but one of the mines examined. The manner in which the foil splits
(when the fuze assembly is fitted) may affect the detection characteristics of the mine.
Determining this would require additional trials.
6. The TNT HE content is stable and well preserved.
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EXAMINATION OF THE SB-33

Figure 1

Figure 2

Seventeen SB-33 mines were recovered from a mixture of dry and wet sites (Figures 1 and 2).
None of the SB-33 mines examined showed signs of significant external degradation, other than a
notable increase in the profile of the rubber pressure plate; this is clear from Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3: An SB-33 recovered from the Falklands;
note the domed profile of the pressure plate

Figure 4: The normal appearance of the SB-33,
with a relatively flat pressure plate

The casing of the SB-33 is made from glass-reinforced polycarbonate and showed no indication of
deterioration whatsoever. However, all of the recovered mines had been buried, and it is probable
that the casings and rubber pressure plates would degrade more quickly after prolonged exposure
to the sunlight.
Expansion of the rubber appears to be due to the material softening when wet, although it continued
to be waterproof. As the rubber dried, the height of the dome reduced noticeably, but not to the
original profile.
Examination of the casing and pressure plate showed that the upper sections of all of the mines had
remained watertight. Where water had penetrated, this appeared to be because the detonator plug
(to the left in Figure 3) had not been tightened sufficiently.
D-1
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Figure 5

Figure 6

Mines were disarmed by unscrewing the detonator assembly from the base well (Figure 5); in most
cases, this plug had been fitted tightly. Once disarmed, the two halves of the mine were unscrewed
using a chain wrench (Figure 6) to access the internal components and main charge.
Figure 7 shows a recovered SB-33
disassembled. Most of the clear
plastic internal fuze components are
made from polycarbonate, and are
therefore extremely strong.
Some casings were made from
olive green plastic; others (including
this one) were grey and merely
painted green on the outside.
None of the internal components
showed any mechanical damage.
The main charge ( RDX/HMX ) was
often cracked, but this would not
affect performance.
Figure 7
Although the mines were generally well sealed, several were damp inside. In many cases this had
caused very minor rusting of the striker spring (which is made from spring steel ‘piano wire’). This
superficial corrosion would have no effect on the performance of the mechanism, nor would it effect
the detectability of the mine.
The firing pin is made from stainless steel and none of those examined showed any significant
degree of corrosion.
Most of the aluminium detonator capsules were in good, functional condition (Figures 8 and 9), but
some did show significant signs of corrosion; see Figures 10 and 11.
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Figure 8: Most detonator assemblies were in
very good condition

Figure 9: The end seals of these detonator
capsules show no signs of deterioration

Figure 10: Some detonator capsules did show
significant signs of degradation

Figure 11: The yellow seal on the stab
receptor appears to have been breached

There was obvious degradation where detonator capsules had been exposed to water for prolonged
periods. It is likely that this had breached the seals of the capsule, particularly the thin yellow
membrane covering the stab receptor. This is significant because the stab-receptive composition is
likely to be affected by water, which may cause the mine to malfunction.
Only one of the recovered SB-33 mines contained a significant quantity of water; this was caused
by the detonator plug not being screwed into place sufficiently tightly. The most obvious result of
the water ingress was the disintegration of the striker spring, which would probably prevent the
mine’s fuze mechanism from actuating and might also make the mine more difficult to detect. The
detonator capsule was also substantially corroded and possibly non-functional.
The badly coroded mine (shown in Figure 12) demonstrates the longer-term fate of all SB-33 mines,
as rubber seals gradually deteriorate and permit water to enter the mine.
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Figure 12: Inside an SB-33 which had been penetrated by water. The most likely cause of failure
would be the disintegration of the striker spring, although degradation of the detonator capsule
might also prevent the mine from operating. Note that the stainless steel firing pin is virtually
unaffected

Conclusions
1. Most of the SB-33 mines examined appeared to be fully functional.
2. The rubber pressure plates were distorted where the material appeared to have softened;
this probably indicates the beginning of degradation that would eventually lead to failure.
3. Deterioration of the rigid mine casings was minimal and all of the mines examined retained
their structural integrity.
4. Minor dampness inside the mines has caused only minor deterioration of the striker springs.
This will not significantly affect the detection signature or the mine’s ability to function.
5. Degradation of the detonator assembly, due to dampness, may render the mine inoperative;
this would need to be confirmed by testing.
6. The HE charges are well preserved, despite some being cracked.
7. Where water had penetrated a mine, the striker spring and detonator capsule showed
substantial deterioration; this would almost certainly have prevented it from functioning. In
the long term, this is what could be expected to happen to all SB-33 mines in the Falklands.
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EXAMINATION OF THE SB-81

Figure 2

Figure 1

Fifteen SB-81 Anti-Tank (AT) mines were recovered from a mixture of dry and wet sites (Figures 1
and 2). None of these mines showed signs of significant external degradation; in fact, their
appearance was virtually ‘as new’, as shown in Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3: An SB-81 recovered from the Falklands

Figure 4: Base view of the SB-81

The casing of the SB-81 is made from polycarbonate and showed no indication of deterioration
whatsoever. Even the pressure plate, which is made from a polyester elastomer, appeared to be in
pristine condition.
All of the mines examined had been buried in the ground and were not, therefore, exposed to
sunlight. Polycarbonate is known to become brittle after prolonged exposure to sunlight, so it is
probable that exposed mines would show more evidence of degradation.
Examination of the casing and pressure plate showed that all of the mines had remained watertight.
Where there was evidence of moisture on the inside, as with the SB-33, this appeared to be
because the detonator plug (shown in Figure 4) had not been tightened sufficiently.
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Figure 6

Figure 5

With the halves of the casing separated, the internal components could be examined. Figure 5
shows upper section of the mine with the pressure plate removed to reveal the top of the fuze
assembly. The seal around the edge of the pressure plate is critical to the pneumatic function of
the fuze; this is a common point of failure among Italian AT mines. Although small roots were
present on the outside (Figure 6) all seals were intact.
Figure 7

Figure 7shows the major
components of the fuze mechanism.
The fuze is similar to that used in
the SB-33, with most of the clear
plastic internal fuze components
made from polycarbonate.
Not only were the components in
perfect condition, but the thin layer
of grease applied during
manufacture was also present.

As with the SB-33 mines, the SB-81s were generally well sealed, but several were damp inside. In
many cases this had caused very minor rusting of the striker spring (which is made from spring
steel ‘piano wire’). This superficial corrosion would have no effect on the performance of the
mechanism, nor would it effect the detectability of the mine. The firing pin is made from stainless
steel and none of those examined showed any corrosion.
The main charge (approximately 2 kg of TNT/RDX/HMX) is encapsulated in plastic, while the
booster (approximately 140 g of RDX/HMX/wax) is in the form of a pressed disc. These are shown
in Figure 8. Removal of the plastic showed the main charge to be in perfect condition (Figure 9).
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Figure 8: The main charge and booster

Figure 9: The main charge casting

Figure 10: Some detonator capsules showed
significant signs of degradation

Figure 11: The yellow seal on the stab
receptor appears to have been breached

The SB-81 uses the same detonator capsule as the SB-33, albeit in a different holder (Figure 10).
Most were in good condition, but some, such as the one shown in Figure 11, showed obvious signs
of degradation where they had bedome damp. It is possible that, in some cases, this had breached
the seals of the capsule, particularly the thin yellow membrane covering the stab receptor. This is
significant because the stab-receptive composition is likely to be affected by water, which may
cause the mine to malfunction.
Since the casings have endured so well, the deterioration of detonator capsules represents the
most likely cause of failure within the next few years. In the longer term, more water can be
expected to enter the mines as rubber seals gradually deteriorate. In addition to affecting the
detonators, this will also corode the striker springs and cause failure of the fuze mechanism.
Where mines are exposed to sunlight, the elastomer pressure plate is likely to become brittle,
causing the seal around the shoulder to fail. When this is no longer air-tight, the pneumatic
actuation system becomes incapable of operation. Deterioration of the thin diaphragm which bears
on the fuze mechanism will have a similar effect, rendering the mine incapable of functioning as
designed.
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Conclusions
1. Most of the SB-81 mines examined appeared to be fully functional.
2. The mine casings showed no signs of deterioration; however, prolonged exposure to
sunlight is likely to cause degradation that would eventually lead to failure.
3. Minor dampness inside the mines has caused only superficial rusting of the striker springs.
This will not significantly affect the detection signature or the mine’s ability to function.
4. Degradation of the detonator assembly, due to dampness, had occurred in some mines and
might render the mine inoperative; this would need to be confirmed by testing.
5. The HE main charges and boosters were in good condition.
6. The SB-81 is one of the most resilient mines ever made, and is likely to remain a threat in
the Falkland Islands for the foreseeable future.
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